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FUND-MANAGEMENT GENDER COMPOSITION: THE IMPACT
ON RISK AND PERFORMANCE OF MUTUAL FUNDS AND
HEDGE FUNDS

Angela Luongo

Abstract

This paper examines gender differences in fund managers’ risk
tolerance and performance. We explore these differences in both the
universe of U.S. mutual funds and hedge funds using risk and
performance metrics that cover one-year, three-year, and five-year
horizons. We find that funds managed by women outperform those
managed by men with less risky portfolios. The outperformance
persists after adjusting for risk. Overall, the results indicate that
female fund managers are severely underrepresented despite their
quality performance. A workgroup comprised more equally of male
and female managers is likely to lead to greater stability in the
financial markets due to a better blend of investment approaches and
risk tolerances.
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Introduction

Women are fading from the U.S. finance industry. In the past 10 years,
141,000 women, or 2.6% of female workers in finance, left the industry.
The ranks of men grew by 389,000 in that period, or 9.6%, according to a
review of data provided by the federal Bureau of Labor Statistics. Since
2000, the number of women between the ages of 20 and 35 working in
finance has dropped by 315,000, or 16.5%, while the number of men in
that age range grew by 93,000, or 7.3%.
ȋ ʹͲͳͲȌ
Given recent volatile markets and much scrutiny over reckless risk-taking,
these gender shifts are intriguing. Sizeable psychological research focused
on overconfidence and gender biases, which will be reviewed in the
subsequent section, documents that men tend to be overly confident and
risk-seeking, whereas women tend to be risk-averse, especially in maledominated areas such as finance. In an environment where individuals are
offered excessive incentives for risk-taking, an analysis of overconfidence, gender bias, and risk characteristics in mutual funds and hedge
funds warrants further research.
The current study is unique. Using data for one-year, three-year, and
five-year horizons, we are able to analyze market participants’ reactions to
huge market swings, specifically the 2008 financial crisis, and whether
males and females react differently. Although sizable literature already
documents that differences in risk propensity between men and women
exist, we have yet to find research outlining these biases for fund
managers during a financial crisis. We question whether stereotypical
economic behavior anomalies between men and women, such as
overconfidence and gender bias, hold during economic turbulence. Having
concluded that males and females do indeed react differently, while
simultaneously finding that female fund managers are underrepresented,
we argue that a work environment composed more equally of male and
female fund managers is likely to promote stability in the financial
markets.
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I. Literature Review

A. The Efficient Market Hypothesis
The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) has been a central component
of modern finance for several decades. Eugene Fama defines an efficient
financial market in his classical statement as one in which security prices
always fully reflect available information. Therefore, a market is efficient
if security prices adjust rapidly to the arrival of new information. Fama
states that the EMH “rules out the possibility of trading systems based
only on currently available information that have expected profits or
returns in excess of equilibrium expected profit or return” (Fama 1970).
The aforementioned statement is profound, for it asserts that an average
investor will not be able to consistently beat the market; if EMH holds, an
investor should passively hold the market portfolio, as opposed to actively
managing his or her money.
The theoretical foundation for the EMH has three main arguments to
support it. First, investors are rational; hence, they value securities
rationally. Second, if some investors are not rational, then their trades are
not and therefore, cancel each other without affecting prices. The second
argument relies heavily on the assumption that irrational investors have
uncorrelated trading strategies. Third, if investors are irrational in similar
ways, then they are met in the market by sophisticated investors, who
eliminate their influence on prices. Specifically, even if irrational investors
have correlated trading strategies, rational arbitragers will reset prices to
equilibrium (Fama 1965). Consequently, the two broad predictions of the
EMH are the quick and accurate reaction of security prices to information,
and that prices should not react to changes in supply or demand of a
security that are not accompanied by news about the security’s
fundamental value.
The empirical foundations of the EMH are stated in three forms: weak
form, semi-strong form, and strong form. The three forms of EMH allow
Fama to distinguish between three types of “stale” information, which are
of no value to those who wish to make money, that is, to make a superior
return after an adjustment for risk. The weak form EMH states that current
prices reflect all security-market information. Therefore, the relevant stale
information is characterized as past prices and returns. The weak-form
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EMH implies that past rates of return and other market data should have
no relationship with future rates of return. This form of EMH reduces the
“random walk hypothesis,” which Fama defines as the statement that stock
returns are entirely unpredictable based on past returns (Fama 1965). The
overall evidence supports the weak form of EMH. Fama has found no
systemic evidence of profitability of “technical” trading strategies (Fama
1965).
The semi-strong form EMH states that current security prices reflect
all past market information, as well as all public information. As soon as
information becomes publicly available, the information is immediately
incorporated into prices; hence, the semi-strong form EMH implies that
decisions made on new information after it is public should not lead to
above-average risk-adjusted profits from those transactions. The overall
evidence for the semi-strong form EMH is mostly supportive. An event
study conducted by Keown and Pinkerton (1981) analyzed the returns to
targets of takeover bids around the announcement of the bid. The
researchers show that share prices of targets begin to rise prior to the
announcement of the bid as the news of a possible bid is incorporated into
prices, and then jump on the date of the public announcement to reflect the
takeover premium offered to target firm shareholders. Nonetheless,
Keown and Pinkerton’s data shows that the jump in share prices on the
announcement is not followed by a continued trend upward or downward,
indicating that prices of takeover targets adjust to the public news of the
bid instantaneously, consistent with the semi-strong form EMH.
Additionally, the substitution hypothesis is consistent with the semi-strong
form EMH that stock prices do not react to non-information (Scholes
1972). Scholes’ work dealt with the central issue to the arbitrage
arguments in the efficient markets hypothesis, the availability of close
substitutes for individual securities. When arbitrage is needed to make
markets efficient, individual stocks must have close substitutes for such
arbitrage to work properly. When close substitutes are available,
arbitragers can sell overpriced securities and buy cheaper close substitutes,
equalizing their relative prices and making markets efficient. If stocks do
not have close substitutes, investors become indifferent as to which stock
to hold. Consequently, Scholes illustrates the willingness of investors to
adjust their portfolios to absorb more shares without a larger influence on
the price.
The strong-form EMH states that stock prices reflect all information
from past market information and private information. It implies that no
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group of investors should be able to consistently derive above-average
risk-adjusted rates of return, even if they are trading on information that is
not yet known to all market participants; insiders’ information quickly
leaks out and is incorporated into prices. The strong form of EMH
assumes perfect markets where information is cost-free and available to
everyone at the same time. The overall evidence for strong-form EMH is
mixed.
B. Behavioral Finance Casts Doubt on Rational Expectations
The notion that investors are fully rational is difficult to sustain.
Therefore, Fischer Black (1986) illustrates that many investors react to
irrelevant information in forming their demand for securities; they trade on
“noise” rather than information. By reacting to this “noise,” investors are
not abiding by the passive strategies Fama expected of market
participants.
Individuals deviate from rational decision-making in their attitudes
toward risk, expectation formation, and framing of problems. First,
according to “prospect theory,” individuals do not assess risky gambles
following the precepts of rationality; that is, people do not look at the
levels of final wealth they can attain. Instead, people look at gains and
losses relative to some reference point, which may vary from situation to
situation, and display loss aversion, meaning individuals are risk-averse
over gains, but risk-seeking over losses (Kahneman and Tversky 1979).
Second, individuals try to predict future uncertain events by taking a short
history of data and asking what broader picture this history represents;
therefore, people often do not pay attention to the possibility that the
recent history is generated by chance rather than by the implicit model
they are constructing (Kahneman and Tversky 1973). Third, in choosing
investments, investors allocate more of their wealth to stocks rather than
bonds when they see a very impressive history of long-term stock returns
relative to those of bonds, even though they only see the volatile shortterm stock returns (Benartzi and Thaler 1995).
Individuals are not the only investors whose trading strategies are
difficult to reconcile with rationality. Professional managers contribute
much of the money in the financial markets for individuals and
corporations. Not only are professionals subject to the same biases as
individual investors, but as agents managing other people’s money, their
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role introduces further distortions into their decisions relative to what a
fully informed sponsor might wish (Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny
1992). For instance, in order to minimize the risk of underperforming their
benchmarks, portfolio managers may “herd,” that is, select stocks other
managers have selected, or choose portfolios that are close to their
benchmarks. Moreover, professional portfolio managers may add stocks to
their portfolio that have recently done well, and sell stocks that have
recently done poorly, in order to impress investors who receive end-ofquarter and end-of-year reports on portfolio holdings (Lakonishok et al.
1991).
The understanding of limited arbitrage, combined with an
understanding of investor sentiment, helps individuals generate predictions
about the behavior of security prices and returns. This is precisely where
behavioral finance comes into play. The theoretical argument for the EMH
depends on the effectiveness of arbitrage, taking the other side of an
unsophisticated demand for securities in order to return prices to their
fundamental values. First, behavioral finance argues that limited
substitutes for many securities are not always available, making arbitrage
risky and limited. Even when substitutes are available, risk is not always
completely eliminated with arbitrage; prices do not converge to
fundamental values instantaneously. Therefore, prices do not adjust to
information as they should. In fact, prices may react to irrelevant
information, causing unnecessary changes in demand. Second, in order to
understand the form market inefficiency might take, one must understand
investor sentiment, how investors actually form their beliefs and demands
for securities. By understanding investor sentiment, one comes to
understand the disturbances to efficient prices, the common judgment
errors made by a substantial number of investors, rather than the
uncorrelated random mistakes.
C. Overconfidence and Activity in the Financial Markets
Overconfidence is a well-established bias characterized by an
individual’s subjective confidence in the accuracy of his or her own
judgments, as compared to objective accuracy. Research of the calibration
of these subjective probabilities supports the idea that people tend to
overestimate their knowledge and abilities. In a confidence-intervals task,
subjects were asked to record their judgmental fractals for several
quantities unknown to them at the time of assessment. Prior to their
participation in the training exercise, all of the subjects were exposed to
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basic fundamental biases. Nonetheless, subjects still showed a high degree
of overconfidence (Alpert and Raiffa 1982). For instance, Alpert and
Raiffa found that the forecasted 99% intervals of individuals included the
true quantity only approximately 60% of the time. If individuals were well
calibrated, the number of future values that fall outside the estimated 99%
confidence interval should be approximately 1 out of 100. The high
reported values indicate that individuals perceive that they can estimate
future values with much greater accuracy than is actually the case. In fact,
subjects tended to be overconfident on the hard profiles and
underconfident on the easy profiles. Consequently, overconfidence
appears to be greatest for difficult tasks, as well as for tasks with low
predictability, and sluggish, unclear feedback (Fischhoff, Slovic, and
Lichtenstein 1977; Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, and Phillips 1982; Griffin and
Tverksy 1992). Upon selecting a particular security in which to invest, an
investor will not receive clear and concise feedback in a quick fashion.
Due to low predictability and “noisy” feedback, one may conclude that
stock selection is a difficult task, and therefore a task for which people are
most overconfident.
In order to calculate the amount by which an overconfident
investor overestimates his or her precision of knowledge, Odean has
developed a new model of overconfidence (1998). Odean concludes that
overconfidence may result from investors overestimating the precision of
their private signals, or overestimating their abilities to correctly interpret
public signals. Moreover, overconfident investors strongly believe their
personal assessments of a security’s value are more accurate than the
assessments of others; thus, overconfident investors become strongly
attached to their own valuations, and are less concerned with the
valuations of others.
The aforementioned concept is referred to as “difference in
opinion.” Varian focuses on differences in prior beliefs as opposed to
differences in models. Varian shows “the relationship between the
equilibrium price and volume of trade and the equilibrium probability
beliefs about those assets” (1989). Harris and Raviv, on the other hand,
provide a model of speculative trading volume and price dynamics (1993).
They show that trading is generated by differences of opinion among
traders regarding the value of the asset being traded. These differences of
opinion result from different interpretations of public information. The
authors assume that traders are rational in their model, meaning “all the
behavior in the model is maximizing,” in order to help explain the
observed behavior of speculative markets. Harris and Raviv are able to
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ignore learning from market prices and to dispense with noise traders in
their differences-of-opinion model.
Grossman and Stiglitz create a model as an extension of the noisy
rational expectations model (1980). Their results indicate that there is “an
equilibrium degree of disequilibrium;” rational investors only trade and
only purchase information when doing so increases their expected utility.
Therefore, prices partially reflect the information of informed individuals,
arbitragers, so that those who incur costs to obtain information do receive
compensation. However, overconfident, irrational investors lower their
expected utility by trading too frequently. According to Odean,
overconfident investors are unrealistic; they overestimate the likelihood
that they will reap unrealistically high returns and their ability to precisely
estimate these high returns. Additionally, Odean concludes that
overconfident investors expend too many resources, such as time and
money, on investment information. Moreover, overconfident investors
hold riskier portfolios than rational investors even when both the
overconfident investors and the rational investors have the same degree of
risk aversion (1998).
Finally, research concludes that investors decrease their expected
utility by trading too much (Odean 1999; Barber and Odean 2000). In his
study conducted in 1999, Odean finds that the individual securities
investors buy underperform those they sell. When he controls for liquidity
demands, tax-loss selling, rebalancing, and changes in risk aversion, the
investors underperform even more, which suggests that investors are
willing to act on too little information and are willing to act even when
they are wrong. With a different data set, Barber and Odean show that
after accounting for trading costs, individual investors underperform their
benchmarks. The researchers also discover, as the model of
overconfidence predicts, that those who trade more frequently realize the
worst performance.
D. Gender and Overconfidence
Overconfidence is evinced in both men and women; however, men are
generally more overconfident than women (Lundeberg, Fox, and
Puncochar 1994). Discussions of gender differences in overconfidence
often lead to task analysis, as research concludes these differences are
highly task dependent (Lundeberg, Fox, and Puncochar 1994). Lundeberg,
Fox, and Puncochar base their research on a study conducted by Kay
Deaux and Elizabeth Farris (1977), who confirmed that, in general, men
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often claim more ability than do women. The differences in
overconfidence are greatest for tasks perceived to be “masculine” (Deaux
and Farris 1977).
Finance is considered to be a masculine task; thus, men tend to feel as
though they are more competent in dealing with financial matters than do
women (Prince 1993). As a result, men are heavily represented in the
financial services industry. Additionally, Leeney provides all the more
reason to expect that men are more overconfident than women in their
ability to make decisions regarding stock investment. According to
Leeney, gender differences in self-confidence depend on the lack of clear
and unambiguous feedback. When feedback is “unequivocal and
immediately available, women do not make lower ability estimates than
men. However, when such feedback is absent or ambiguous, women seem
to have lower opinions of their abilities and often do underestimate
relative to men” (Leeney 1977). Feedback in the financial markets is
certainly unclear, which leads females to question their abilities.
The source of investor overconfidence is the self-serving attribution
bias (Gervais and Odean 1998). In this model, investors infer their own
abilities from their successes and failures. Due to their tendency to take
too much credit for their successes, they become overconfident. Research
illustrates that the self-serving attribution bias is greater for men than for
women; therefore, women are likely to become less overconfident than
men. Because men are more overconfident than women, men will trade
more frequently than women (Barber and Odean 2001). Research
conducted by Barber and Odean demonstrates that trading reduced men’s
net returns by 2.65% a year as opposed to 1.72% for women (2001).
E. Gender and Risk Tolerances
According to Slovic, a cultural belief exists that men should, and do,
take greater risks than women (1966). This assumption is consistent with
Grable’s finding that males have higher propensities for risk than females
(2000). However, when comparing risk tolerances of males and females
toward abstract and contextual situations, the results deviate from previous
findings. Male and female subjects do not differ in their risk propensities
toward decisions; yet, in abstract situations, differences in risk propensity
do arise. Additionally, the comparative risk propensity of male and female
subjects in financial choices strongly depends on the decision frame.
Gender-specific risk propensities arise in abstract gambles, with men
being more risk-prone toward gains and women more risk-prone toward
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losses. The aforementioned results appear to question the relevance of
stereotypical gender-specific risk attitudes (Schubert, Brown, Gyslet, and
Brachinger 1999). Those who study the link between gender and
investment prowess say risk management is key to the success of female
money managers. Therefore, women are not necessarily afraid of risk;
they are just better at managing it (Denmark 2009).
F. The Market’s Perception of Female Managers
Women are expected to be more conservative investors than men and
are consequently offered investments with lower risk and therefore lower
expected returns (Wang 1994). Nonetheless, the market favorably greets
the news of selecting a female CEO with statistically significant abnormal
stock-price reactions. Tests of the difference between valuation effects of
female and male CEO appointments show there is no significant
difference, indicating that financial market participants are not less
confident in female CEOs (Martin, Nishikawa, and Williams 2009). The
researcher of the current study questions whether Martin, Nishikawa, and
Williams’ finding will hold when referring to female investment
managers, due to the fact that they are directly managing money matters.
Using data from the U.S. mutual fund industry, research illustrates that
although female and male managers do not differ in average performance,
female managers receive significantly lower inflows, suggesting that
female managers may be stereotyped as less competent (Niessen and
Ruenzi 2007).

II. Research Questions
The researcher poses the following questions:
1. Has the perception that female portfolio managers are more
risk-averse than male managers diminished as cultural
advancement has shattered glass ceilings?
2. Can a work environment comprised more equally of males and
females create greater stability in the financial markets, due to
a better blend of investment approaches and risk tolerances?
3. Could this greater stability in the financial markets prevent
future crises?
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III. Hypotheses
The following testable hypotheses are the focus of the present inquiry:
1. Portfolios of female managers of mutual funds and hedge funds
have higher annualized returns than those of male managers of
mutual funds and hedge funds. Annualized returns are absolute
returns over a specified period aggregated to a period of one
year. Annualized returns are used for the purpose of comparing
returns over different periods.
2. Portfolios of male managers of mutual funds and hedge funds
have higher standard deviations (ı) of monthly returns than
those of female managers of mutual funds and hedge funds.
The standard deviation is a statistical measure applied to the
weekly, monthly or annual rate of return of a portfolio to
measure its volatility. Standard deviation explicates historical
volatility and is used by portfolio managers to estimate the
amount of expected volatility. Funds with large standard
deviations deviate from the expected returns, and are
characterized as riskier portfolios.
3. Portfolios of male managers of mutual funds and hedge funds
assume more idiosyncratic risk, demonstrated by the R-squared
(R2) statistic, than those of female managers of mutual funds
and hedge funds. R2 is a percentage of systematic risk to total
risk. A large R2 figure indicates that the portfolio’s
idiosyncratic risk is small. One may mitigate idiosyncratic risk,
also known as nonsystemic risk, through diversification.
4. Portfolios of female managers of mutual funds and hedge funds
have greater Sharpe ratios than those of male managers of
mutual funds and hedge funds due to smart investment
decisions, not as a result of excess risk. The Sharpe ratio
measures risk-adjusted performance. The ratio is calculated by
subtracting the risk-free rate from the rate of return for a
portfolio and dividing the result by the standard deviation of
the portfolio returns. The Sharpe ratio demonstrates whether a
portfolio’s returns are due to smart investment decisions or a
result of excess risk. Therefore, the greater a portfolio’s Sharpe
ratio, the better its risk-adjusted performance.
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5. The female presence, that is, the proportion of females to
males, in mutual funds is larger than that of hedge funds, due to
the basic nature of hedge funds (i.e. high risk profiles).
IV. Data and Methodology

The data used for this research is secondary data, gathered from the
Bloomberg terminal database. The universe includes U.S. mutual fund
data and U.S. hedge fund data compiled using the Bloomberg fund
screening function, “FSRC.” For each fund, Bloomberg provides
information dealing with the fund’s holdings, domicile, country of
availability, fund manager, etc. All of the screening criteria used for this
study, and descriptions of each, can be found in Appendix A.
Two sample data sets are used. The sample set of data for hedge
funds include information for 5,022 funds. The sample set of data for
mutual funds include 72,271 funds. Not all 77,293 funds are used in this
research. Many funds do not include the manager name. For those that do,
we only use the mutual funds and hedge funds for which we are able to
identify the gender of the manager. If the gender of a manger cannot be
determined for a particular fund, it is eliminated. Therefore, the 4,980
mutual funds and 2,962 hedge funds that remain are the funds used in the
research. Using Excel, we sort each data set by gender. For each screening
criteria within both data sets, the means are taken for the funds managed
by women and men. The two-tailed heteroscedastic t-test is used to assess
whether the differences between the means of the two groups are
statistically significant. Using SAS, we calculate the percentage of female
managers to male managers. Additionally, we use SAS to control for Firm
Assets Under Management and Management Style for gender
comparisons. When controlling for AUM, the following criteria are
analyzed in the mutual fund data set: Total Return, Standard Deviation,
and Sharpe Ratio. For hedge funds, the following criteria are analyzed:
Total Return, Standard Deviation, Sharpe Ratio, and R-Squared.

V. Data Analysis
A. Mutual Funds
Figure 1 presents the results for testing the hypothesis that funds
managed by female managers exhibit lower total risk over one-year, three-
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year, and five-year periods. For the one- year period, we have 4,214 male
managers and 293 female managers; for the three-year period, we have
3,357 male managers and 246 female managers; and for the five-year
period, we have 2,585 male managers and 204 female managers, for which
we have standard-deviation data for fund returns. The average standard
deviation is higher for male managers for all three test periods, and the
difference is statistically significant with a 5% significant level. Note that
the in-group standard deviation is higher for male managers than for
female managers, illustrating that male-managed funds are more
heterogeneous in their risk exposure. One possible reason for this is the
fact that male-managed funds cover a broader range of investment styles
than female-managed funds.
ņ Figure 1 ņ

One year monthly
One year monthly
One year monthly

Standard Deviation
Statistics
Male
N
4214
Mean 17.41560038
Standard Deviation 14.06585092

Female
293
16.50331058
6.16270063

T-test Prob

0.0303634

Three year monthly
N
Three year monthly
Mean
Three year monthly Standard Deviation

3357
24.12200775
15.06324513

246
22.92475610
8.50944204

0.04732210

Five year monthly
Five year monthly
Five year monthly

2585
20.11493230
10.46928956

204
18.77171569
7.08305551

0.01294118

N
Mean
Standard Deviation

Figure 2 examines differences in systematic risk between male- and
female-managed funds. We measure systematic risk by beta. Beta
measures the exposure of the fund for market moves. Here, we have fewer
funds with reported beta. For the one-year period, we have 2,285 male
managers and 197 female managers; for the three-year period, we have
2,016 male managers and 172 female managers; and for the five-year
period, we have 1,780 male managers and 151 female managers. Femalemanaged funds have lower systematic risk, especially over the one-year
period. The higher beta for male-managed funds reflects either high
market exposure or high leverage. However, none of the differences
passes the 5% significance test. It is not clear whether the lack of
significance is due to smaller sample sizes.
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ņ Figure 2 ņ
Beta
Statistics
N
Mean
Standard Deviation

Male
2285
1.06875711
6.36631708

Female
197
0.90477157
0.16409173

0.220107596

Three year monthly
N
Three year monthly
Mean
Three year monthly Standard Deviation

2016
0.90299603
2.79881465

172
0.93255814
0.22883476

0.647935897

Five year monthly
Five year monthly
Five year monthly

1780
0.94061236
1.35581728

151
0.91403974
0.23083957

0.47543734

One year monthly
One year monthly
One year monthly

N
Mean
Standard Deviation

T-test Prob

The results in Figure 2 tempt us to conclude differences in total risk
are driven by differences in systematic risk. Figure 3 confirms this
hypothesis. In Figure 3 we examine differences in R2. Recall that R2
measures the ratio of systematic risk to total risk. Thus, 1-R2 measures the
ratio of unsystematic risk to total risk. Higher R2 implies lower systematic
risk as a percentage of total risk. We have almost the same funds in the
sample as those in Figure 2. The differences in R2 are significant for oneyear and three-year periods and border significance for the five-year
period.
ņ Figure 3 ņ

One year monthly
One year monthly
One year monthly

R-Squared
Statistics
Male
N
2289
Mean
0.78499782
Standard Deviation
0.29439818

Female
199
0.86929648
0.15042535

T-test Prob

3.41238E-11

Three year monthly
N
Three year monthly
Mean
Three year monthly Standard Deviation

2016
0.82410714
0.24419676

172
0.85953488
0.14245883

0.00384321

Five year monthly
Five year monthly
Five year monthly

1780
0.81481461
0.23322077

151
0.83655629
0.15736601

0.12056415

N
Mean
Standard Deviation
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Figure 4 presents the results for testing the hypothesis that funds
managed by female managers outperform their male counterparts, as
measured by total returns, over one-year, three-year, and five-year periods.
For the one-year period, we have 4,237 male managers and 296 female
managers; for the three-year period, we have 3,372 male managers and
248 female managers; and for the five-year period, we have 2,602 male
managers and 204 female managers. The average annualized total returns
for portfolios managed by female managers are higher than those of
portfolios managed by male managers for all three test periods, and the
mean differences are statistically significant. Note that the in-group
standard deviations are higher for male-managed funds across all three
time periods; this indicates that returns across all male-managed funds are
more heterogeneous than returns across all female-managed funds.
Moreover, the three-year results are influenced by the 2008 financial
crisis. Female-managed funds still had higher returns than male-managed
funds. The results in Figure 4 suggest that female managers make more
consistent investment decisions. This may be a more positive trait,
especially during a market collapse, than the more aggressive disposition
of male managers, as demonstrated in the figures on risk above.
ņ Figure 4 ņ

One year monthly
One year monthly
One year monthly

Total Returns
Statistics
Male
N
4237
Mean 14.10622138
Standard Deviation 17.69804969

Three year monthly
N
Three year monthly
Mean
Three year monthly Standard Deviation
Five year monthly
Five year monthly
Five year monthly

N
Mean
Standard Deviation

Female
296
16.17520270
9.56409192

T-test Prob

0.00089663

3372
2.67392645
10.53071566

248
4.60112903
7.59624142

0.00021804

2602
2.45733666
6.98182865

204
3.54210784
4.09210317

0.00072065
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Figure 5 presents results that compare the average alpha for malemanaged and female-managed funds. Alpha is the fund’s return adjusted
for beta risk. The mean for female-managed funds over the one-year
period, 23.8%, far exceeds its male counterpart of 8.3%. While the mean
difference is large, it is statistically not significant. Note the in-group
standard deviation of the male-managed funds is far larger than its female
counterpart. This indicates that the male-managed funds are very
heterogeneous compared to the female-managed funds. Such large
standard deviation is the result of failing to reject the null hypothesis at a
5% significance level. We reject the null hypothesis with a 15.6%
significance level. For the three-year period, the mean difference tilts
toward the female-managed funds; yet, the difference is less striking and
statistically insignificant.
ņ Figure 5 ņ
Alpha
Statistics
N
Mean
Standard Deviation

Male
2285
0.08303282
4.90471054

Female
197
0.23786802
0.51358536

0.155341063

Three year monthly
N
Three year monthly
Mean
Three year monthly Standard Deviation

2016
0.06343254
2.83513500

172
0.07936047
0.46174617

0.825652897

One year monthly
One year monthly
One year monthly

T-test Prob

Figure 6 presents the results for testing the hypothesis that funds
managed by female managers exhibit higher Sharpe ratios over one-year
and three-year periods. For the one-year period, we have 4,213 male
managers and 293 female managers; for the three-year period, we have
3,356 male managers and 246 female managers. The higher in-group
standard deviation for male managers than for female managers illustrates,
as previously stated, that male-managed funds are more heterogeneous in
their risk exposure. We conclude that mutual funds managed by women
have better risk-adjusted performance; superior returns are due to smart
investment decisions, not a result of excess risk.
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ņ Figure 6 ņ

One year monthly
One year monthly
One year monthly

Sharpe Ratio
Statistics
Male
N
4213
Mean
1.41441253
Standard Deviation
1.37188904

Three year monthly
N
Three year monthly
Mean
Three year monthly Standard Deviation

3356
0.18484207
0.54788313

Female
293
1.64040956
0.85911461
246
0.32963415
0.43759019

T-test Prob

0.00004059

0.00000145

B. Hedge Funds
Due to the small pool of female managers within the hedge fund data
set, some results are not statistically significant. Additionally, note that
beta is not available in the hedge-fund data as most hedge funds target
zero beta, that is, zero exposure to obvious risk factors, such as equity
indices, for their funds.
Figure 7 presents the results for testing the hypothesis that funds
managed by female managers exhibit lower total risk over one-year, threeyear, and five-year periods. For the one-year period, we have 3,980 male
managers and 137 female managers; for the three-year period, we have
2,592 male managers and 91 female managers; and for the five-year
period, we have 1,453 male managers and 46 female managers, for which
we have standard-deviation data for fund returns. The average standard
deviation is higher for male managers for all three test periods, and the
difference is statistically significant with a 5% significant level. Note that
the in-group standard deviation for male managers is almost twice as high
as that for female managers. This illustrates that male-managed funds are
more heterogeneous in their risk exposure. As stated previously, a possible
reason for this is the fact that male-managed funds cover a broader range
of investment styles than female-managed funds.
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ņ Figure 7 ņ

One year monthly
One year monthly
One year monthly

Standard Deviation
Statistics
Male
N
3980
Mean
11.65337688
Standard Deviation
13.55980118

Female
137
10.09051095
7.00551330

T-test Prob

0.01497338

Three year monthly
N
Three year monthly
Mean
Three year monthly Standard Deviation

2592
16.79795910
13.23247658

91
14.82241758
9.38243292

0.054877379

Five year monthly
Five year monthly
Five year monthly

1453
15.24774948
10.71614069

46
12.81021739
6.84625396

0.02391956

N
Mean
Standard Deviation

The findings support the hypothesis that hedge funds managed by
women are less risky than those managed by men. Figure 8 shows that in
the short term, female-managed funds exhibit less R2 than male-managed
funds. Note that 1- R2 measures the percentage of unsystematic risk to
total risk. For the one-year period, male-managed funds have less
unsystematic risk than female-managed funds. In fact, 69.5% of the risk is
unsystematic for male-managed funds, while 94.4% of the risk is
unsystematic for female-managed funds. Given that female-managed
funds have lower overall total risk, it must be the case that femalemanaged funds have lower systematic risk than their male counterparts.
For three-year and five-year periods, we accept the hypothesis that maleand female-managed funds have similar percentages of unsystematic risk
relative to total risk. Given that female-managed funds have lower total
risk, funds managed by women are likely to have lower systematic risk.
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ņ Figure 8 ņ
Statistics
N
Mean
Standard Deviation

R-Squared
Male
445
0.19224719
0.30536182

Female
14
0.05642857
0.12899655

0.001909128

Three year monthly
N
Three year monthly
Mean
Three year monthly Standard Deviation

338
0.39831361
0.31239260

11
0.50454545
0.29837438

0.271093839

Five year monthly
Five year monthly
Five year monthly

233
0.38356223
0.29611088

9
0.38777778
0.28769679

0.96660951

One year monthly
One year monthly
One year monthly

N
Mean
Standard Deviation

T-test Prob

Figure 9 presents the results for testing the hypothesis that funds
managed by female managers outperform their male counterparts, as
measured by total returns, over one-year, three-year, and five-year periods.
For the one-year period, we have 4,027 male managers and 138 female
managers; for the three-year period, we have 2,611 male managers and 93
female managers; and for the five-year period, we have 1,474 male
managers and 47 female managers. We conclude that female managers
are severely underrepresented in U.S. industry. As a result, very few data
regarding female-managed funds’ total returns are available. Although the
results support our hypothesis, the mean differences between male- and
female-managed funds are not statistically significant.
ņ Figure 9 ņ
Statistics
N
Mean
Standard Deviation

Total Returns
Male
4027
7.54148249
17.76002648

Female
138
9.04224638
16.92985300

Three year monthly
N
Three year monthly
Mean
Three year monthly Standard Deviation

2611
1.15693987
11.95479112

93
4.37623656
17.51611853

0.08198478

1474
4.46278155
8.37717389

47
7.01404255
16.83044132

0.30593023

One year monthly
One year monthly
One year monthly

Five year monthly
Five year monthly
Five year monthly

N
Mean
Standard Deviation

T-test Prob

0.30833247
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Figure 10 presents results that compare the average alpha for malemanaged and female-managed funds. Recall that alpha is the fund’s return
adjusted for beta risk. The mean for female-managed funds over the oneyear period, 15.9%, exceeds its male counterpart of 12%. However, the
mean difference is statistically not significant. Note that the in-group
standard deviation of the male-managed funds is far larger than that for
female-managed funds. This indicates that the male-managed funds are
very heterogeneous compared to the female-managed funds. For the threeyear period, the mean for female-managed funds is 69%. This is more than
twice the mean of male-managed funds at 27.7%. Although the difference
is striking, it is statistically insignificant. Again, we find that the malemanaged funds are very heterogeneous compared to the female-managed
funds due to much larger in-group standard deviation. Such large standard
deviation is the cause of failing to reject the null hypothesis at a 5%
significance level. We reject the null hypothesis with a 12.5% significance
level.
ņ Figure 10 ņ
Alpha
Statistics
N
Mean
Standard Deviation

Male
445
0.12033708
1.82339838

Female
14
0.15857143
0.88235574

0.880827534

Three year monthly
N
Three year monthly
Mean
Three year monthly Standard Deviation

338
0.27730769
1.52435466

11
0.69000000
0.78640956

0.12512061

One year monthly
One year monthly
One year monthly

T-test Prob

Figure 11 presents the results for testing the hypothesis that funds
managed by female managers exhibit higher risk-adjusted performance,
measured by the Sharpe ratios, over one-year and three-year periods. We
find that in the short term, funds managed by women have higher Sharpe
ratios than those managed by men. However, for the three-year period,
funds managed by women have lower Sharpe ratios than funds managed
by men. Nonetheless, the results are not statistically significant for either
time period. Note that the Sharpe ratio is accentuated by investments that
don’t have a normal distribution of returns. Many hedge funds use
dynamic trading strategies and options that give way to skewness and
kurtosis in their distribution of returns.
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ņ Figure 11 ņ

Statistics
N
Mean
Standard Deviation

Sharpe Ratio
Male
3977
0.96820971
3.15647719

Female
136
1.26823529
4.54834978

0.446749638

Three year monthly
N
Three year monthly
Mean
Three year monthly Standard Deviation

2592
0.26243827
1.22958312

91
0.25197802
1.09317501

0.929011617

One year monthly
One year monthly
One year monthly

T-test Prob

C. Female Presence
As hypothesized, the female presence in mutual funds was larger than
that in hedge funds; however, the difference was not as large as
anticipated. The female presence in mutual funds was 8.72%; the female
presence in Hedge Funds was 4.25%. The small sample size of females
strengthens the argument that female fund managers are underrepresented
in both mutual funds and hedge funds.
D. Control for Firm Assets Under Management
We observe that female fund managers are concentrated in funds with
lower levels of Assets Under Management (AUM) (Figure 12), insinuating
female managers are more likely to be hired by small firms. Given the
concentration of female managers in funds with relatively low AUM, we
were concerned that if funds with low AUM outperform those with large
AUM, then gender difference would be confounded with AUM
differences. Within our small subset of funds, there are no significant
differences in return and risk between funds with low levels of AUM and
high levels of AUM (Appendix B). Therefore, in our sample, the gender
differences are not driven by AUM differences.
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ņ Figure 12 ņ

Mutual Funds

Hedge Funds

AUM (millions)
Statistics
Male
N
24
Mean
518.70
Standard Deviation
1335.87
N
Mean
Standard Deviation

352
46824.75
235866.38

Female
2
101.55
143.05
12
528.79
902.59

T-test Prob

0.1664

0.0003

While this suggests the results of the current study are likely to be
robust, there is a limitation in the data. Controlling for AUM with more
data may change this study’s conclusion.
E. Control for Management Style
Concerned that different styles may exhibit different risk-return
profiles, we control for management style as defined by Bloomberg
(Figures 13, 14, and 15). We find that female portfolio managers are
concentrated in only three strategies: Sector Funds (Equity funds), Total
Returns (Debt funds), and Value. Therefore, it is difficult to control for
fund management strategy. Fuller data sets for future research may change
this study’s conclusion.
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ņ Figure 13 ņ
-------Std Dev 1Y M-------Gender

Management Style

N

Mean

Std Dev

Female

Sector Funds (Equity funds)

42

19.3214286

4.25943691

Female

Total Return (Debt funds)

24

8.2066667

1.17741673

Female

Value

36

19.3794444

3.25015511

Male

Sector Funds (Equity funds)

364

20.4550275

4.88703415

Male

Total Return (Debt funds)

209

9.5789952

9.20900722

Male

Value

560

20.1839464

6.44725091

ņ Figure 14 ņ
Least Squares Means

Std Dev 1Y M

LSMEAN

Gender

Management Style

LSMEAN

Number

Female

Sector Funds (Equity funds)

19.3214286

1

Female

Total Return (Debt funds)

8.2066667

2

Female

Value

19.3794444

3

Male

Sector Funds (Equity funds)

20.4550275

4

Male

Total Return (Debt funds)

9.5789952

5

Male

Value

20.1839464

6
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ņ Figure 15 ņ

Least Squares Means for effect Manager Gender * Management Style
Pr > |t| for H0: LSMean(i)=LSMean(j)

Dependent Variable: Std Dev 1Y M
i/j

1

1

2
<.0001

3

4

5

6

0.9683

0.2790

<.0001

0.4014

<.0001

<.0001

0.3217

<.0001

0.3380

<.0001

0.4664

<.0001

0.5308

2

<.0001

3

0.9683 <.0001

4

0.2790 <.0001

0.3380

5

<.0001 0.3217

<.0001

<.0001

6

0.4014 <.0001

0.4664

0.5308

<.0001
<.0001

VI. Conclusion
This paper contributes to the existing literature discussing economic
behavior anomalies; the current study examines the relationship between
risk and performance of U.S. mutual funds and hedge funds and the
portfolio manager’s gender. Although sizable literature already documents
that men tend to be overly confident and risk-seeking, whereas women
tend to be risk-averse, we have yet to find research outlining these biases
during a financial crisis. Having gathered data for one-year, three-year,
and five-year horizons, we are able to analyze whether males and females
react differently to huge market swings; three-year results are influenced
by the 2008 financial crisis. We find that female managers are, in fact,
more risk-averse than male managers. The results indicate that a work
environment comprised more equally of male and female portfolio
managers is likely to create more stability in the financial markets, due to
a better blend of investment approaches and risk tolerances.
Additionally, we observe that female fund managers are concentrated
in funds with lower levels of Assets Under Management (AUM). This is

Fordham Business Student Research Journal

71

due to the fact that female managers are more likely to be hired by small
firms. Given the concentration of female managers in funds with relatively
low AUM, we were concerned that if funds with low AUM outperform
those with large AUM, then gender difference would be confounded with
AUM differences. Within our small subset of funds, we find no significant
differences in return and risk between funds with low levels of AUM and
high levels of AUM. Therefore, in our sample, the gender differences are
not driven by AUM differences. We conclude that if female managers
outperform male managers, they should attract more funds because people
seek better returns.
Despite so-called “shattering the glass ceiling,” female managers are
drastically underrepresented, which begs the question: must female
managers be “exceptional” to land positions in the first place? And, are
they held to a higher standard once they do secure these positions? Given
that women who manage to break through harder barriers to become
portfolio managers are more exceptional than their male counterparts, it is
possible that when women get to have equal opportunity to be hired like
men, they may lose part or perhaps all their advantage. However, this
question cannot be answered until we have a far more balanced workforce
of fund managers. The study should be examined with fuller data sets and
more females in the industry to examine the robustness of these results.
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Appendix A. Descriptions of Screening Criteria1
A. Management
Fund Manager: Person or persons that make daily investment
decisions for the fund.
Fund Manager Start Date—The date that the manager begins
managing the fund.
B. Classifications (Prospective Based)
Management Style: The investment strategy the manager implements
for investment decisions, as stated in the prospectus.
Strategy: The investment strategy the manager concentrates on for
investment opportunities, as stated in the prospectus or offering
memorandum.
C. Assets
Firm Assets Under Management: The total assets under management
by the investment manager/investment advisor. This includes assets
within funds and separately managed accounts. This field displays
U.S. dollars (millions).
D. Quantitatives

Total Return 1Y (Performance Metric): One-year total return of a
security as of the date of the last close price. Start date is the first
business day on or before 12 months (to the date) prior to the ending
date (as of date). The return combines price appreciation (or
depreciation) and dividend distributions. The dividends are reinvested
back into the security. If the ending date is the last day of the month,
the start date is derived using end-of-month conventions.
Total Return 3Y/5Y Ann (Performance Metric): The three-year, fiveyear annualized return on the security including appreciation and
dividends, assuming the dividends are reinvested back into the
security. If no price is available on the start or end date of the current
period, the calculation will look to the fund-pricing frequency for a
valid price. If the fund prices daily, the calculation will look back three


1

Descriptions provided by Bloomberg
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business days for a price. If the fund prices weekly, the calculation will
look back seven business days for a price. If the fund prices
infrequently, the calculation will look back a maximum of 30 business
days for a price. If no valid price is found, then N.A. will be returned.
Standard Deviation (Risk Metric): Volatility from the average of
returns of defined granularity over time frame specified. It measures
how widely spread the values in a period are. The bigger it is, the most
risky is the security.
•

1Y Monthly Annually (Std Dev 1Y-M)

•

3Y Monthly Annually (Std Dev 3Y)

•

5Y Monthly Annually (Std Dev 5Y)

Sharpe Ratio (Risk/Return Metric): A risk-adjusted measure developed
by William F. Sharpe that calculates the excess performance with
respect to the Risk Free Rate (in our case the yield three months linked
to the currency), per unit of volatility over the time frame specified.
Performance is measured as mean return. Components are annualized.
The higher the Sharpe ratio, the better the fund’s historical riskadjusted performance.
•

Sharpe 1Y Monthly

•

Sharpe 3Y Monthly

•

Sharpe 5Y Montly

R-squared (Tracking and Correlation Metric): A measurement of how
well a security’s performance correlated with the performance of a
benchmark index, such as the S&P 500, and thus a measurement of
what portion of its performance can be explained by the performance
of the overall market or index. Values for r-squared range from 0 to 1,
where 0 indicated no correlation and 1 indicates perfect correlation.
•

1Y Weekly

•

3Y Monthly

•

5Y Monthly

78

Fordham Business Student Research Journal
Alpha (Tracking Metric): Intercept of the regression line of the
security and benchmark returns of defined granularity over time frame
specified. A coefficient which measures risk-adjusted performance,
factoring in the unsystemic risk, rather than market risk (systemic
risk). An indication of whether a security is undervalued or overvalued
in relation to other securities with similar systemic risk.
•

1Y Monthly

•

3Y Monthly

•

5Y Monthly

Beta (Tracking Metric): Slope of the regression line of the security and
benchmark returns of defined granularity over time frame specified. A
coefficient which measures systemic risk. A beta over 1 is more
volatile than the overall market, while a beta below 1 is less volatile.
•

1Y Monthly

•

3Y Monthly

•

5Y Monthly

Appendix B. Control for Firm Assets Under Management
A. Mutual Funds
Total Return 1Y

GLM Procedure ņ Total Return 1Y
Parameter
Estimate Standard Error
t Value
AUM
--15.663
0.25327954
61.84
AUM
High
31.465
7.11327811
4.42
AUM
Low
15.1573
3.03311198
5.00

`Pr > |t|
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
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Level of AUM
--High
Low

N
3155
4
22
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`-----Total Return 1Y----Mean
Std Dev
15.6629857
14.2514006
31.4650000
13.9608464
15.1572727
9.859138

Standard Deviation 1Y

GLM Procedure ņ Standard Deviation 1Y
Parameter
Estimate Standard Error
t Value
AUM
--18.1628
0.20646135
87.97
AUM
High
18.785
5.78091774
3.25
AUM
Low
19.4273
2.46499161
7.88

Level of AUM
--High
Low

`Pr > |t|
<.0001
<.0012
<.0001

`-----Standard Deviation 1Y----N
Mean
Std Dev
3136
18.1628061
11.6001163
4
18.7850000
8.8285087
22
19.4272727
3.0450806

Sharpe Ratio 1Y

GLM Procedure ņ Sharpe Ratio 1Y
Parameter
Estimate Standard Error
t Value
AUM
--1.67441
0.15657484
10.69
AUM
High
2.205
4.38339655
0.50
AUM
Low
1.31455
1.86908657
0.70

`Pr > |t|
<.0001
0.615
0.4819
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Level of AUM
--High
Low

`-----Sharpe Ratio 1Y----N
Mean
Std Dev
3135 1.67440510 8.80016906
4 2.20500000 0.34539832
22 1.31454545 0.56457086

B. Hedge Funds
Total Return 1Y

GLM Procedure ņ Total Return 1Y
Parameter
Estimate Standard Error
t Value
AUM
--8.71107
0.50167926
17.36
AUM
High
10.4121
2.90658796
3.58
AUM
Low
6.84392
1.51997984
4.5

Level of AUM
--High
Low

N
2249
67
245

`Pr > |t|
<.0001
0.0003
<.0001

`-----Total Return 1Y----Mean
Std Dev
8.7110716
24.6950263
10.4120896
13.5079275
6.8439184
16.3139922

Standard Deviation 1Y

GLM Procedure ņ Standard Deviation 1Y
Parameter
Estimate Standard Error
t Value
AUM
--11.6036
0.40930427
28.35
AUM
High
12.4338
2.37543985
5.23
AUM
Low
11.3833
1.23797784
9.20

`Pr > |t|
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
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Level of AUM
--High
Low
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`-----Standard Deviation 1Y----N
Mean
Std Dev
2223
11.6036122
20.1721864
66
12.4337879
11.7933406
243
11.3832922
10.8783374

Sharpe Ratio 1Y
GLM Procedure ņ Sharpe Ratio 1Y
Estimate Standard Error
t Value
Parameter
AUM
--1.36064
0.36928070
3.68
AUM
High
1.13742
2.14171231
0.53
AUM
Low
1.18786
1.11616902
1.06

Level of AUM
--High
Low

`Pr > |t|
0.0002
0.5954
0.2827

`-----Sharpe Ratio 1Y----N
Mean
Std Dev
2220 1.36063514 18.5231124
66 1.13742424
1.9167170
243 1.18786008
3.5932446

R-Squared 1Y

GLM Procedure ņ R-Squared 1Y
Parameter
Estimate Standard Error t Value
AUM
--18.4516
17.4461356
1.06
AUM
High
0.25250 137.0937718
0.00
AUM
Low
0.12261
57.1720550
0.00

Level of AUM
--High
Low

`-----R-Squared 1Y----N
Mean
Std Dev
247 18.45161940 287.782773
4 0.25250000 0.28194300
23
0.1226087
0.2748750

`Pr > |t|
0.2912
0.9985
0.9983
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